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The argument 
 
The relationship between democracy, security and development is at the heart of 
global liberal governance. It has been enshrined by the UN as a guiding principle of 
international cooperation1.  At the same time it is hotly disputed. On the one hand by 
realists who argue that promotion of democracy conflicts with the requirements of 
security and unduly restrains the pursuit of national interest. On the other hand by 
radical critics who view it as an ideological fig-leaf for intervention by powerful 
international actors in the affairs of poor and vulnerable countries. 
 
Are the critics right? Is the relationship between democracy and security a shotgun 
marriage in which (to adapt Hobbes) guns are trumps – and democracy (like 
development) is inexorably ‘securitised’?  During the Cold War it used to be claimed 
that it was in the West’s enlightened self-interest to support both democracy and 
development in order to drain the swamp of discontent in troubled peripheries. The 
current instrumentalization of democracy as a solution to ‘political extremism’, 
‘radical Islam’ and ‘terrorism’ is simply the latest twist in a tangled and murky tale. 
 
This paper argues that these issues cannot be settled without a deeper interrogation 
of democracy on the one hand and of security on the other and of how they 
interconnect. Do they simply articulate different even if sometimes conflicting forms 
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of hegemony? Or can they voice the real concerns and interests of citizens, including 
those most vulnerable to poverty and insecurity?  
 
It then situates these debates in the contested world of democratic transition, and 
‘post-conflict’ peace-building. In particular it is asked why international promotion 
of democracy has so often failed to create viable democratic institutions, let 
establish liberal peace. It calls for a more nuanced understanding of the real politics 
of democratisation in particular national and regional contexts, including its many 
pitfalls.  
  
Liberal Peace - Democracy and (In)Security 
 
The central conjecture of liberal peace, as already suggested, is that democracies are 
inherently better than other political systems at resolving violent conflicts between 
and within states. In the first place they pose a moral alternative to violence rooted 
in conceptions of human rights. Secondly democratic institutions create procedures 
and establish forums in which demands can be negotiated and conflicts resolved 
through the political process, without recourse to violence. Thirdly societies and 
groups, which share common democratic values, have less reason to go to war with 
each other. Fourth the impacts of political democratization tend to be reinforced by 
economic liberalization and global capitalist markets, which integrate economies in 
networks of inter-dependence, substituting trade for violence. 
 
However, all of these remain at best plausible hypotheses rather than established 
truths, and remain open to dispute and debate2. There is strong empirical evidence 
that democracies do not go to war with each other. But the causal mechanisms 
remain unclear and are hard to disentangle from the particular historical matrix of 
post World-War II Western Europe and North America.  
 
Moreover there is a sting in the tail – namely that democracies seem to have few 
inhibitions about going to war with non-democracies. Whether liberal peace will 
prevail in a world in which Western hegemony is increasingly challenged by the 
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emergence of new centres of global capitalism and political power like China, India 
or Brazil, is far from certain. 
 
Moreover the jury remains out on whether democracies are better able than non-
democratic systems to resolve conflicts within their own boundaries: the experience 
of Northern Ireland, Colombia, Mexico, Sri Lanka or India in Kashmir, Punjab and 
Gujerat among others seems to suggest otherwise.  
 
Nor have Western democracies been consistent in their support for democracy in 
the developing world. Their own democratization was built on the foundations of 
populist imperialism and colonial expansion. After World War I the Wilsonian vision 
of a liberal world order sought to universalize democracy, but foundered on the 
rocks of economic depression and fascism. It was reinstated after World War II 
through the creation of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
Since then Western powers have intervened militarily in the South in a number of 
shifting and inconsistent guises: as colonisers and occupiers; through support for 
‘democracy’ against ‘communism’ during the Cold War; as backers of authoritarian 
as well as democratic regimes; as opponents or (when it suited them) supporters of 
nationalist or Islamist insurgencies; as peace-keepers, peace-enforcers and peace-
builders; as guarantors of security in fragile or failing states under international 
trusteeship; and as enforcers and occupiers in the war on terror. 
 
In sum one may tell two contrasting stories about the marriage between democracy 
and security, which is consecrated beneath the tattered banner of liberal peace (see 
Table 1 below). The first sees democracy as an alternative to violence; and violence 
and insecurity as threats to democracy. But it also sees security as potentially 
problematic when prioritized above democratic accountability and freedoms. Hence 
security is compatible with democracy only if public authority remains legitimate; if 
security institutions are under firm democratic control; if the security of citizens is 
the touchstone of state security; and if there is broad consensus about the norms 
governing the latter – all of which have to be organized not assumed by democratic 
governments. 
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According to the second story both democracy and security are contested and the 
relationship between them tends to be antagonistic. Liberal peace lends an illusory 
aura of respectability to security architectures constructed around military power 
and preservation of corporate wealth. Indeed security is unequally distributed 
between North and South, rich and poor, and this places it on a collision course with 
democracy. Rather than resolving the underlying conflicts of multiethnic societies, 
democratic contestation tends to awaken and aggravate them. When the 
international community launches humanitarian interventions to resolve such 
conflicts, protect civilians, rebuild states and establish democratic governance, it 
tends instead to establish new forms of imperialism. 
  
  
Table 1. Democracy and Security: Harmonious Partnership or      
Shotgun Marriage?  
 
Harmonious partnership Shotgun marriage 
• Liberal peace: common 
security is easier in a world 
of democracies. 
• ‘Indivisibility of security, 
economic development and 
human freedom’. 
• Global security and national 
stability are preconditions 
for democracy.  
• Democratic institutions are a 
forum for peaceful 
resolution of conflicts. 
• Democracy assures 
legitimate public authority 
and hence security. 
• Democratic control prevents 
abuses by military and 
security establishments. 
• Liberal peace conceals deep 
global and national 
inequalities in wealth, power 
and security  
• Humanitarian intervention, 
‘the responsibility to protect’ 
and the ‘war on terrorism’ 
open the door to new forms 
of imperialism 
• Dangers of ‘securitization’ of 
democracy and of 
development.  
• Premature democratization 
and elections polarize 
conflicts 
• Security may be invoked to 
reduce liberties and close 
democratic spaces 
  
 
5
 
• Human rights and freedoms 
protect against abuse of 
power and securitization  
• Human security and 
democratic citizenship are 
mutually reinforcing.    
 
• Military and security role 
expansion occurs under the 
cloak of security 
• Frictions between state, 
citizen and human security 
are endemic.   
 
 
It is argued below is that these two accounts should not be seen as sharply posed 
alternatives, but rather as two interlinked narratives forming part of an unresolved 
conversation or argument about democracy and its relationships with security.   
 
 
Democracy and Security: Essential yet Contested Concepts 
 
The conceptual fog around democracy is almost as dense as that swirling around 
security. Different definitions lead down divergent analytical and political paths. 
Both concepts are deeply disputed and contradictory. The propositions below spell 
out some of the controversies around each concept, and their implications for liberal 
peace. 
 
Seven Propositions about Democracy 
 
1. Democracy is inherently value laden. It is founded on three mutually interdependent 
principles, namely (i) political participation and government by consent; (ii) political 
equality3; and (iii) universal citizen and human rights.  
 
Democratic values are open to dispute, reinterpretation and debate in different 
national, historical and cultural contexts. Yet they have universal appeal, speaking to 
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vast numbers of people in many different societies over centuries of history. They 
are inherently emancipatory and even sometimes subversive, encouraging citizens 
to challenge state power and hold rulers accountable. Democracy was a central 
demand of anti-colonial nationalism. It still animates popular struggles against 
despotic regimes to this day. Indeed much of the disillusion surrounding modern 
democracies stems from their perceived failure to match up to their own democratic 
principles – rather than rejection of democratic values per se.  
 
Narrow procedural definitions of democracy (e.g. Przeworski’s concise ‘democracies 
are political systems in which governments lose elections’4) may lend themselves 
better to empirical analysis. But they tend to foreclose debate about whether and 
how far contemporary liberal democracies really are democratic.  
 
It is true that citizens in modern democracies participate in governance and enjoy 
political equality largely in their capacity as voters. But there is far less participation 
and virtually no political equality when it comes to determining policy, influencing 
decisions and shaping political outcomes - all of them heavily biased towards the 
holders of corporate wealth, media influence, bureaucratic position and political 
power.  
 
Thus there is a glaring contradiction at the heart of liberal democracy  between 
formal electoral participation and equality on the one hand and de facto 
disempowerment and inequality on the other. Existing liberal democracies are in 
need of democratization, as well as the authoritarian systems they have been 
sweeping aside. 
  
2. In its modern form democracy is hegemonic and deeply conditioned by Western 
history, global capitalism and military power. 
 
Parekh insists on the ‘cultural particularity of liberal democracy’, arguing that its 
emergence in Europe was preceded and deeply conditioned by early capitalism, 
liberalism and the limited state5. Tilly suggests that the industrialization of war, 
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state-building and imperial expansion were all linked to the emergence of modern 
democracies6. They required the assent of middle class taxpayers and the industrial 
working class, who were mobilized into politics and began pressing demands on the 
state. An influential strand in democratic theory sees electoral democracy and the 
capitalist marketplace as mutually reinforcing; some theorists indeed suggesting 
that inequality is required for party systems to function.7 
 
Hence there has always been a tension between electoral democracy and 
progressive politics. The popular gains of working class politics, popular movements 
and social democracy8 began to be eroded almost as soon as they were achieved. 
The modern story of democracy has witnessed the fragmentation of progressive 
movements and political parties, the transformation of democratic politics into 
public relations and the de facto hegemony of corporate capitalism and large 
bureaucracies, including security establishments. But far from making democracy 
irrelevant, the emergence of new forms of hegemony make it all the more important 
that it should be revitalized and reinvented for the twenty-first century.  
 
3. Electoral democracy, in which political parties compete for votes, is the political 
counterpart of capitalist competition, and at the same time in deep tension with it. 
Money politics, corruption, inequality and even violence are not simply externalities 
but tend to arise from democratic contestation itself. 
 
This tension is manifested in a number of ways. Market liberalism tends to elevate 
the choices of consumers and firms over those of voters and elected governments. 
The scope for democratic choice is narrowed by governments’ inability or 
unwillingness to regulate the market and confront corporate and media power. In 
developing countries the room for maneuver is even less, as many of the most 
fundamental decisions are left to markets or dictated by donors and international 
financial institutions.  
 
                                               
6 Tilly (1985) 
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Moreover competition for the vote requires political machines and finance (as noted 
by political analysts since the time of Weber and Michels)9.  The dominant forms of 
party organization in Western democracies tend to be oligarchic, developing 
symbiotic relationships with the media and corporate capitalism.  
 
In new democracies political competition tends to be even more lightly regulated 
and patronage politics reflect what one prominent analyst of African politics calls 
the ‘politics of the belly’10. When parties are largely financed through corruption, the 
rules of democratic competition are loose and the costs of losing elections are high, 
it is hardly surprising that elections become contentious and sometimes violent. ‘A 
violence called democracy’ is the dominant reality in all too many cases11.  
 
4. Democracies almost invariably fall short of their own standards and face deep 
democracy deficits, notably where security is concerned.  
 
When authoritarianism was the dominant form of governance in most of the 
developing world Sklar argued that democracy might nevertheless exist ‘in parts’ 
within the limited political spaces available in the interstices of autocratic regimes – 
and could become the starting point for protest movements and ultimately 
democratic transition12.  
 
The converse also applies: even established democracies remain at best only 
democracies in parts. Democratic institutions are riddled with democratic deficits 
and lend a veneer of legitimacy to state and corporate hierarchies, which have 
limited interest in accountability and transparency.13 Security apparatuses tend to 
be especially resistant to democratic oversight; as well as penetrating deep into civil 
society. The current proliferation of surveillance technologies and limitations on 
                                               
9 Weber (1921);  Michels (1962);  Held (1987: chapter 5) analyses the influence of both thinkers 
on the ‘competitive elitism’ of Western liberal democracy.  
10 Bayart (1993) 
11 The phrase comes from Schirmer’s (2000) analysis of the vicissitudes of military-dominated 
democratization in Guatemala. 
12 See Sklar (1987)  
13 On democracy deficits see Luckham et al 2003: 24-8. 
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civil rights introduced in Western democracies in response to political 
‘radicalisation’ and terrorism are part of such a tendency. 
 
The real world of democracy is peopled by democracies with greatly varying 
credentials. Political scientists use the term ‘democracy with adjectives’ to 
characterise these hybrid forms of governance: ‘pseudo-democracy’, ‘semi-
democracy’, ‘low-intensity democracy’, ‘illiberal democracy’ ‘sovereign democracy’, 
‘nomenclatura democracy’ ‘anocracy’ are some of the terms which have been used14. 
Even qualifying terms like ‘liberal’, ‘electoral’, ‘multi-party’ or ‘participatory’ 
democracy, also reflect the complexity of democracy and the controversies 
surrounding it.   
 
Clearly not all democratic transitions fit the same analytical mould; and not all result 
in functioning democracies. Some, as we shall see later, are the largely creatures of 
Western democracy promotion agendas; others have arisen from internal struggles 
for democratic participation. Such distinctions should be the starting point for more 
informed analysis of the democracy deficits in particular national contexts, as well 
as of the spaces which exist or can be opened for political change. 
 
5.‘The democratization of democracy’ is invariably work in progress, depending upon 
the mutual interplay of democratic institutions and democratic politics. 
 
Political watersheds such as the ‘peoples power’ revolution in the Philippines, 
transition from apartheid in South Africa and the electoral victories of Lula in Brazil 
and Obama in the USA remind us that citizen activism and participation can shift the 
direction of national politics, sometimes fundamentally. Yet the democratic gains 
secured at such critical conjunctures seldom live up to expectations. In the long haul 
democratic institutions are needed to assure accountable and effective governance – 
and sometimes indeed to restrain attacks on civil liberties by elected politicians in 
countries like Italy, Venezuela or Sri Lanka, not to mention the United States and the 
UK.  
 
                                               
14 See Collier and Levitsky  (1997) and Ottaway (2003).  
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Neither democratic institutions nor elections can guarantee democracy without 
active citizenship, well-organized political parties, a vital civil society and 
independent and critical media. Democratic politics must articulate some 
conception of a public sphere, in which voting and citizen participation can make a 
real difference to political outcomes. A modicum of social equity is necessary to 
ensure substantive as well as purely formal political equality.  
 
Most liberal democracies have the utmost difficulty living up to these requirements. 
Hence participatory democracy has sometimes been posed as an alternative, as in 
Sandinista Nicaragua or Tanzania under Julius Nyerere15. Neither of these 
experiments was sustainable, in part due to external destabilization, and in part 
because of their internal flaws. Yet their failure does not diminish the case for 
participatory democracy - which remains an important area of academic enquiry, as 
well as being a powerful inspiration for activist politics. Rather than being posed as 
an alternative form of governance in its own right, participatory democracy tends 
now to be seen as a way of democratizing liberal democracy itself – deepening the 
latter and of expanding the spaces for political participation within it. This is of 
course a veritable task of Sisyphus, demanding constant democratic struggles. 
 
Democratic struggles are equally if not more salient in authoritarian and quasi-
authoritarian regimes, even where they run up against walls of obstruction as in 
Zimbabwe, Burma or Iran. Such countries are democracies in the sense that they 
have many active citizens prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the sake of their 
rights and liberties. Arguably they are even more democratic in this regard than 
many established democracies, where citizens fail to participate or take their 
liberties for granted. But it is their institutions as well as their regimes, which are 
undemocratic - enabling regimes to actively resist democratic accountability and 
crush citizen participation. 
  
Not all forms of politics, even those, which raise the banner of democracy, are 
democratic - and some may be violent. Party politics (even in Western societies) is 
often corrupt and divisive. Civil society seldom fits romanticized stereotypes. The 
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countries and their ultimate inability to develop sustainable alternatives to liberal democracy. 
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potential ambiguities of  citizen participation are illustrated by the recent (2008-9) 
street protests and blockades by ‘yellow shirt’ and ‘red shirt’ demonstrators 
supporting government and opposition parties in Thailand. Should these be seen as 
instances of effective civic action in the face of unresponsive and non-accountable 
governments? Or as factional struggles by organized groups attempting to close 
political spaces to others and subvert democratic institutions?  
 
Those resorting to violence sometimes claim democratic credentials when they 
confront an oppressive state, enjoy popular legitimacy, or enable participation by 
disempowered citizens – like the liberation struggles in Ethiopia, Eritrea and South 
Africa or the Maoist rebellion in Nepal. But one crucial litmus test of their claim to 
be ‘democratic’ is whether they have exhausted alternative ways of pursuing 
democratic struggles through the political process. Another is whether they are 
capable of transcending the exclusionary legacies of violence once liberation is 
achieved, rather than erecting new forms of despotism, as in Eritrea. 
  
6. Democratic citizenship incorporates imagined national communities. Nationalism is 
inherent and its relationship to democracy is problematic.     
 
All contemporary democracies are organized within national territorial spaces. 
Nationalism is inscribed into democratic citizenship, although there are many 
different ways in which national political communities are imagined. Some tend to 
be more exclusive than others, for instance if citizenship is defined in terms of 
shared descent or religion rather than residence and civic rights. Common 
citizenship tends to be especially fragile and contested in multiethnic states, 
especially those with major ‘horizontal inequalities’ among national, ethnic or 
religious groups.  
 
It is hardly surprising that democratization should politicize such divisions and 
reinforce the insecurities associated with them. A substantial empirical literature 
analyses how electoral contestation politicizes identities and fosters identity-based 
violence16. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that democratization can awaken ethnic 
and nationalist conflict. Added to this it may also foster intolerance of non-citizens: 
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immigrants, refugees or excluded minorities like Roma in Eastern Europe17 – 
exposing tensions between national citizenship and wider conceptions of human 
rights. The dark side of democracy may be ethnic cleansing and even genocidal 
violence18.  
 
Yet democracies do not have a monopoly on extreme nationalism or ethnic politics. 
Far from it. Autocracies are sometimes more successful in suppressing overt 
manifestations of ethnic politics, often brutally. But they tend to develop their own 
less visible ways of manipulating ethnic divisions and targeting dissident minorities 
as security threats. When political liberalization brings suppressed cleavages into 
the open, they tend to be all the more virulent for having been previously forced 
underground. To blame the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism on democratization demonstrates a certain lack of historical 
perspective. 
 
Hence the relationship between democratization and identity-based conflict is 
neither inevitable nor irreversible. There is body of analysis, which suggests that 
democratic institutions, including voting systems, can be designed to reduce ethnic 
etc polarization and reduce the likelihood of it turning violent. Its findings are far 
from conclusive19. Indeed ‘designer democracy’ can sometimes have perverse 
effects, sharpening rather than resolving underlying conflicts, as in Fiji20. Democratic 
institutions cannot resolve conflicts unless supported by extensive investment in 
less divisive forms of democratic politics.  
 
7. Democracy and universal human rights are woven into the entire fabric of global 
governance and liberal peace. Yet the globalization of democracy is increasingly 
contested and problematic.  
 
The making of liberal peace and of a rules-based international order has been 
difficult and protracted. Even though democracy and human rights were installed as 
                                               
17 Roma are of course citizens but not perceived as such by many of their fellow citizens.  
18 The perverse relationship between democracy and ethnic cleansing is explored by Mann (2005) 
19 See Luckham et al (2003), pp 37-51 for an overview.  
20 Fraenkel (2003). 
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global norms under the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights they 
have been applied selectively – not least by Western democracies in their dealings 
with the developing South21. Transitions to democracy before the end of the Cold 
War in countries like Spain, the Philippines, South Korea, Chile or Brazil indeed went 
somewhat against the grain by bringing down dictatorships, which had previously 
received support from the West. Whilst Western powers did not necessarily oppose 
democratization, they did not actively promote it either, the principal drivers of 
change being largely internal.   
 
It is only since the end of the Cold War that Western democracies have become 
active in promoting democracy and liberal peace in the South and East. The central 
paradox has been that they have done so at a time when the limitations of liberal 
democracy have become ever more apparent in Western democracies themselves 
and in the international community. The institutions of the UN, World Bank, IMF, 
NATO, the EU etc are far from outstanding paradigms of accountable governance 
themselves22.  
 
Democracy-promotion, especially by force, is an oxymoron23; and tends to be 
especially problematic when harnessed to security priorities. Democracy is far more 
likely to take root when it is the product of vigorous internal struggles for 
democracy and human rights rather than of external imposition. This does not mean 
there is no role for international support of legitimate and locally supported 
democratic transitions. But is preferable that democracy should emerge of its own 
accord and its own pace, not one dictated by Western proselytizers of liberal peace.   
 
Seven Propositions about Security 
 
                                               
21 Sands’ (2005) excellent account of the making of the international legal order identifies its many 
shortcomings – but argues that substantial progress has nevertheless been made toward a rules-
based international order.   
22 On democratic deficits and mechanisms of accountability in international politics, see Grant and 
Keohane (2005).  
23 Von Hippel (2000) 
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1. Security is a socially (and politically) constructed concept with multiple discursive 
registers. It is a discourse of risk-avoidance and fear rather than a language of 
emancipation. The crucial questions are who talks security? Whose security? And from 
what threats or risks?24 
 
In contrast to democracy, which is unequivocally an Enlightenment narrative, 
security is trapped uneasily between the Enlightenment and neo-medieval 
narratives of war and violence25.  ‘Security’ is often used on its own, as if self-
evidently tangible. Yet invariably it has to be fleshed out with descriptors. Who talks 
security, the security of what or whom (the international community, the state, 
citizens, human beings?) and from what threats is often left implicit. But it has to be 
contextualized in order to make sense. Indeed security is often defined in contrast to 
what it is not: i.e. the absence of violence and other forms of risk; negative rather 
than positive peace. 
 
The highly stratified nature of the international system and of the states within it 
makes it all the more important to be specific about whose security is in question. 
On the one hand security is a global and national public good, in which all states and 
their citizens have a stake. On the other hand its intimate connections to violence, 
power and social regulation mean it is not and cannot be distributed equally. Hence 
it is in permanent tension with democracy.  
 
Almost endless lists of threats and risks have been constructed: wars, ethnic 
conflicts, nuclear proliferation, rogue states, terrorism, transnational crime, 
HIV/AIDS, climate change and so forth. What unites these diverse issues is how they 
are ‘securitized’: i.e. singled out as existential risks demanding the urgent attention 
of states and the international community26. Even when couched in the discourse of 
human rather than state security, they tend to evoke the language of threat and fear 
historically associated with state security – rather than alternative languages of 
peace, cooperation and solidarity.     
                                               
24 See the important tradition of critical security studies, notably the studies in Krause and 
Williams (1997) and Booth (2005). 
25 Cerny (1998). 
26 Buzan et al (1998)  
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2. Security carries heavy Hobbesian historical baggage: that of state sovereignty 
constructed around monopolies of force. This remains enormously powerful, yet is 
deeply problematic and increasingly challenged. 
 
The theory and practice of security has been and still largely remains a sovereign 
narrative of power, as seen by states, rather than constructed from below through 
the participation of citizens. State authority backed up by violence (Weber’s 
‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’) remains 
at its very core.27 
 
Yet in a globalised world military force tends to be a diminishing asset, even in the 
hands of a superpower like the United States. State authority is exercised in tandem 
with many hybrid forms of power, some working through the state, some 
networked around it, others undermining or challenging it. Even in the more 
established states key security matters are determined not only by governments, 
but also by global markets and financial institutions, the media, international firms 
and even criminal mafia (as in the ‘war on drugs’).  
 
In ‘fragile’ states, formal sovereignties and monopolies of force have crumbled, 
eroded internally by political and criminal violence and externally through the 
spread of insecurity across national borders. Nevertheless international policy 
responses to state fragility still tend to endorse state-centered conceptions of 
security. Post-conflict ‘state-building’ has tended to prioritize the restoration of the 
traditional attributes of state power: capacity to tax, to administer, to assure law and 
order and to assure external and internal security.  
 
Deep issues persist around the entire Weberian vision of state security constructed 
around force and surveillance. Military regimes have largely (but not entirely) 
                                               
27 Weber’s (1921: 77-8) characterization of the state remains (though much criticized) central to 
the theory and practice of statecraft. It is what Foucault (1980) terms a ‘sovereign’ narratives of 
power (hence security) from the top, contrasting it with ‘capillary’ narratives, seeing power as 
rooted at all levels of society. Scott’s critique of “seeing like a state” is pertinent to humanitarian 
intervention and state-building as well as to development.  
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vanished from the developing world. But security institutions remain powerful in 
many new democracies, even if their power has been invisible-ized, often behind 
walls of secrecy. How to control these institutions, and assure they are accountable 
and respect the rule of law, is difficult even in stable democracies, let alone in new 
democracies or post-conflict states.  
 
3. Security straddles war and peace, violence and non-violence, which should be seen 
as interrelated rather than mutually exclusive28.  
 
Both realist and critical security studies have questioned the dichotomy between 
war and peace, violence and non-violence, but for entirely different reasons. For 
realists the central concern of security policy has been how states can protect 
themselves from aggression and assure peace and security, if necessary through 
force or the threat to use it; as epitomized in the old saw ‘if you want peace, prepare 
for war’. Yet they also recognized that military competition between states (and 
alliances) creates the very insecurity it is designed to avoid: the so-called ‘security 
dilemma’, which was at the crux of nuclear deterrence and arms control during the 
Cold War. 
 
Realists were unsettled by the end of the Cold War. Some heralded the arrival of the 
United States as an unchallenged superpower able to translate its immense military 
power into durable influence as the protector of the liberal peace - a vision, which 
collided disastrously with reality in Iraq and Afghanistan. Others remained more 
cautious, warning against Western intervention in the complex conflicts of the 
developing world, which were best left to play themselves out: ‘give war a chance’ 
was the cynical mantra of a leading Washington exponent29. There has been a 
distinct shift toward the latter school of thought under the ‘stabilization’ or ‘security 
first’ paradigms now being applied in Iraq and Afghanistan, which sideline 
democratization and political reform.  
 
Critical analysts likewise have argued that war and peace are not polar opposites, 
but intimately connected. They dispute the narrative, which underpins 
                                               
28 This point is well made by Keen (2008: chapter 1 ‘War’). 
29 Luttwak (1999). 
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humanitarian intervention, according to which the  ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War 
era are regressive and destructive of development. War and violence are normal and 
not necessarily pathological; they may even be ‘sites of social innovation’30, as in 
societies stifled by neo-patrimonial rule or imperial violence. They also dispute the 
case for liberal peace: not only because it legitimizes Western interventions; but also 
for being hegemonic in it own right.  
 
4. Security fuses both the outer and the inner gaze of the state. It is constructed at 
multiple levels from global to national to local.   
 
Security analysis traditionally focused largely on international relations. States were 
the main units of analysis; they existed in a condition of international anarchy; and 
the issue was how they could assure security through international cooperation, 
power balances, deterrence etc. Yet there was a less visible subtext of internal social 
control, which cropped up in Western democracies in a variety of guises: anti-
communism, mistrust of organized labour, or surveillance of protest movements etc.  
 
In most developing countries in contrast, internal and especially regime security has 
been the main preoccupation of governments and security decision-makers. 
Nevertheless internal security has often been perceived through the lenses of 
hegemonic ideologies: as in the anti-communist national security doctrines of many 
Latin American and Asian military regimes during the Cold War; or more recently 
through the profound impacts of the wars against terror and organized crime on 
security perceptions in countries like Colombia, Indonesia  or Ethiopia.  
 
Increasingly the security of states (and of the people who live in them) has become 
hostage to factors and agents over which they have limited if any control: global 
markets and financial insecurity; climate change and resource scarcities; commerce 
in conflict resources, arms and military services; flows of combatants and refugees 
across national boundaries; interventions by major powers, international bodies 
and neighboring states; networked diasporas and terrorists; peace-keepers, 
humanitarian agencies and NGOs. The very idea of an overarching state, providing 
                                               
30 Duffield (2001:  ) 
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defence against external aggression and public order and social regulation within 
national borders, has come increasingly in question.  
 
Even military insecurity no longer takes the traditional forms, and has had to be re-
thought: in terms for instance of ‘asymmetric warfare’ in which technology and 
firepower are neutralized at local levels by more flexible and decentralized ways of 
fighting; or of ‘network wars’ linked across different global, national and local 
spaces; or of ‘regional security complexes’ with regions and localities rather than 
states as the major unit of analysis. 
 
The ‘multilevel governance of security’ is one way of characterizing this situation. 
States are not irrelevant, but their capacities to deliver security, law and order vary 
greatly and even in the case of the most powerful states are shared with many other 
organizations and bodies.  
 
This raises acute problems for democratic governance. If states have little influence 
over the factors determining security and insecurity, who then can be held 
accountable, for what and by whom? Can and should the international community 
stand in for absent, ineffective or unresponsive states? Who speaks for the 
international community and are they any better able to regulate or reduce the main 
sources of insecurity?  How can they be held to account, given the well-known 
accountability deficits of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, international NGOs 
and other institutions of global governance31? 
 
5. Security is widely represented as a public good: i.e. ‘international’, ‘collective’ or 
‘common security’ globally; ‘regional security’; and ‘national’ and ‘public security’ 
within states. Yet it is also inherently hegemonic, tending to stabilize inequalities in 
power and wealth, globally, regionally and nationally. 
 
In principle security is not divisible. It advances a vision of common security against 
shared threats. It belongs in the public sphere and is not tradable in the market. 
Thus it requires collective action: by states acting on behalf of their citizens; or by 
the international community inspired by some wider conception of humankind.  
                                               
31 Grant and Keohane op. cit. 
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Yet the problems of collective action are enormously difficult to resolve not least in 
a democratic framework, still more internationally. Moreover normative 
constructions of security as a public good emerged from a particular historical and 
ideological context. They remain in various ways politically contested. And like 
many other public goods, security has increasingly been privatized.  
 
The security architecture established under the UN Charter both established a 
framework for international cooperation and drew explicitly on the norms and 
ideals of the universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the same time it was 
constructed around the principles of non-intervention and the protection of national 
sovereignties. It thus reflected the underlying tensions between international and 
national security. The UN Security Council represented an uneasy compromise 
between collective security and vast international disparities in wealth and power – 
in effect enabling the major powers to call the shots on behalf of the international 
community. 
 
Consensus around international norms remains fragile and is not always matched 
by serious commitment to international cooperation. Since the end of the Cold war 
the UN has shifted decisively from limited peacekeeping and conflict prevention to 
more robust conflict resolution, peace enforcement and peace-building. But how far 
this has tangibly reduced conflict and insecurity remains open to debate, as 
discussed later in this chapter. Moreover, the emergence of liberal peace has been 
overshadowed by the ‘war on terror’ and the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Kosovo, Chechnya, Georgia etc - driven by the security priorities of major powers 
and alliances rather than any more widely shared consensus about international 
peace and security.  
 
6. Security like democracy tends to be imagined and structured around national, 
regional, religious and ethnic identities, which may themselves become sources of 
insecurity  
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National security is hard to disentangle from the imagined communities given 
political form in nation-states32. Nationalism in one guise or another is built into 
security narratives, and is further complicated where such nationalism draws on the 
cultural repertoires of regional (e.g. Pan-African), religious (e.g. Christian, Buddhist 
or Islamic) or ethnic (e.g. Croatian, Sinhala or Hindu) identities.  
 
Whilst national security and imagined national identities are interrelated they also 
tend to be in deep tension, especially in multicultural societies. ‘Horizontal 
inequalities33’ between different identity groups are a major source of insecurity, 
with ethnic, religious  etc signifiers used to mobilize people and groups into 
violence. 
 
What is less often noted is how states and their security apparatuses often deploy 
markers of identity as tools of security management and political control. In colonial 
times they recruited from allegedly ‘martial races’ like the Ghurkas, still recruited 
into the British armed forces. Authoritarian regimes often recruit their military and 
security apparatuses from particular clans, sects and ethnic groups connected to the 
ruling elite. Security services of both democracies and autocracies continue to single 
out particular groups (Moslems, Tamils, Uighurs, Roma etc) for surveillance, or to 
regard their rights as less worthy of protection than other citizens.  
 
Such practices tend to embed ethnic conflict and potentially violence deep in the 
heart of the state and its governing elites as well as within civil society. They also 
have corrosive effects on the construction of nationality and democratic citizenship 
in multi-ethnic societies, particularly where (as in Sri Lanka) the social imaginary of 
the nation- state privileges markers of identity associated with the majority over 
others.34   
 
                                               
32 Enloe (1980) remains the most perceptive analysis of the imagination of security through ethnic 
narratives, especially in colonial and post-colonial settings.  
33 Stewart (2008). 
34 See the insightful analysis by De Mel (2009) of the privileged place of Sinhala identity in the 
social imaginary of the Sri Lankan state and its role in the conflict. One is also reminded of 
controversies over alleged cultural markers of ‘Britishness’, such as the infamous ‘cricket test’. 
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7. State-centered conceptions of security are challenged by discourses of citizen and 
human security, in turn closely drawing on ideas of democracy, development, human 
rights and liberal peace35. But even state security implies that the state has a contract 
with citizens as well as obligations to the international community. In sum state 
security and citizen and human security are mutually supporting as well as mutually 
opposed. 
 
The discursive shift from state-centered to ‘human’ or ‘citizen’ security has 
coincided with the erosion of the conventional attributes of statehood by globalised 
markets and new forms of risk. It has become increasingly apparent that global 
challenges like climate change, health pandemics or nuclear proliferation threaten 
all human beings and cannot be managed by states acting on their own - nor even by 
cooperation solely among states.  
 
The emergence of human security also reflects the failure of many states to ensure 
the physical safety of their own citizens in situations of violence. Indeed in the worst 
cases it has become apparent that states are agents of insecurity, rights violations 
and human misery in their own right – as in countries like Burma, Zimbabwe or 
North Korea. Even the governments of relatively legitimate and well-established 
states, like Brazil, China, India or the UK, may not sufficiently protect the security 
and rights of their more marginalized citizens, not to speak of immigrants and 
refugees.   
 
Human and citizen security draw on the discourses of human rights, citizenship and 
democracy. They do not replace state security, but rather provide a language and 
criteria to interrogate whether states actually protect the safety and rights of their 
citizens. As well they provide criteria to evaluate the international community’s 
                                               
35 It was indeed a major development agency, the UNDP, which first popularized the idea of human 
security through its Human Development Reports from 1994. On the concept and the debates it 
has stimulated see Commission on Human Security (2003), Jolly and Basu Ray (2007), Tadjbakhsh 
and Chenoy (2007). The Commission on Human Security explicitly makes the connection to 
democracy and human rights.   
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responses to the existential risks facing all human beings - including those arising 
from oppressive or failing states. 
 
It is precisely for this reason that human security has become such a controversial 
concept. Much of the controversy has focused not on human security itself, but on 
the principle of the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) 
vulnerable groups not adequately protected by their own states,36.  Supporters of 
the principle argue that the sovereign independence of states recognized under the 
UN Charter and protected by international law is not absolute but comes with 
obligations towards citizens. The international community cannot stand by when 
governments commit or encourage large-scale violence against their own citizens 
(as during the Rwandan genocide or in Darfur); or even when they ignore natural 
catastrophes engulfing their own citizens, as in the aftermath of the recent typhoon 
in Burma. The ‘responsibility to protect’ codifies and arguably extends current 
humanitarian practice – whilst spelling out strict criteria defining the circumstances 
in which humanitarian intervention is and is not appropriate. It does not create an 
unrestricted right to intervene.  
Nevertheless many Southern governments have expressed deep reservations the 
‘responsibility to protect’ – arguing that it opens the door to intervention, 
undermines hard-won national independence and threatens their national security. 
Oppressive and failing regimes have another less openly acknowledged anxiety: that 
R2P could expose and deepen the rift between them and the citizens they are failing 
to protect. 
 
These concerns are echoed in academic critiques of the new humanitarianism37. 
Western governments, they argue, make selective use of human rights and human 
security, to legitimize interventions supporting their own security and economic 
interests. These interventions shade subtly into intrusive engagement by a wide 
range of other international actors (the UN, IFIs, donors, humanitarian agencies, 
                                               
36 Elaborated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001) 
and subsequently endorsed by the UN.  
37 Duffield (2001), Chandler (2006: chapter 1) extends the critique to democratization, human 
rights, civil society and a range of other concepts used by Western states and international 
institutions “to deny the power they wield and evade the responsibility for its exercise”.  
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international NGOs etc) in the affairs of conflict-affected states. Human security 
tends to be especially open to abuse, as it easily leads to the labeling of rights 
abuses, poverty, disease or environmental degradation as ‘security’ issues.     
 
These critiques have considerable force. Yet they tend to discount the subversive 
potential of human security. Not only does it provide civil society or human rights 
groups with critical analytical and policy tools with which to hold governments in 
Western as well as developing countries to account. The same critical tools can be 
turned on global corporations, IFIs and other powerful international actors. In the 
Niger Delta, for instance, community activists made skilful use of connections with 
international media, environmental and human rights groups to mount an effective 
campaign secure redress for the environmental damage and human rights abuses 
caused by oil corporations in collusion with the Nigerian federal government38.  
 
One can only imagine the international furor were independent human security 
audits to be carried out on all actors (including the internationals) in Darfur or the 
Eastern DRC. Or the consternation were the UN apply the full rigors of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ in an assessment of international intervention forces as 
well as local military actors in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
It is one thing to criticize Western powers and the international community for 
double standards in their application of humanitarian and human rights principles. 
It is quite another to argue that the principles themselves are hegemonic. Any ‘grand 
narrative’ claiming individuals have universal entitlements as human beings is open 
to the charge of disregarding cultural or religious sensitivities (for example over 
women’s rights or the boundaries between religion and politics). But cultural and 
religious norms are open to different constructions; these can reaffirm as well as 
clash with universal standards. Without such standards there would be no basis for 
opposing global or national injustice and violence; nor for international cooperation 
to meet the global challenges facing all human beings. 
 
 
The Real (and Highly Contested) World of Democratic Transition  
                                               
38 See Watts (2004) and Ibeanu and Luckham (2007)  
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Why has democratisation so often failed to consolidate democracy, still less 
bring an end to violence and insecurity? To understand this question one must first 
reassess the jagged wave of democratic transitions, which swept across the South 
and East from the 1980s, coinciding with and in some cases resulting from the end 
of the Cold War39. Even if these appeared to herald massive transformations in 
national and global governance, the reality was less triumphal and more 
contradictory.  
 
A number of democratic transitions were achieved by hard-fought popular 
struggles against the authoritarian and communist regimes of the period. The 
political changes they introduced were significant. Both military regimes and 
communist autocracies were swept away. Military coups became less frequent, 
despite their occasional reappearance countries like Fiji, Thailand, Mauritania, 
Madagascar, Bangladesh or Honduras.  
 
To be sure, the transitions were not always in reality to democracy. Some 
were merely to new forms of authoritarianism. Others brought armed conflict and 
state failure in their wake, as in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. But even non-
democratic regimes are routinely obliged to redecorate autocracy in the trappings of 
liberal democracy. The major exceptions, like Burma or North Korea, increasingly 
appear like toxic flotsam left behind by an advancing democratic tide. 
 
Yet the earlier optimism about the spread of democracy, still more about its 
efficacy as a panacea for violent conflict, has proved misplaced. Political and 
criminal violence (or both interacting) remain major facts of political life in many 
countries, which have made ‘successful’ transitions to competitive multi-party 
politics, like the Philippines, Thailand, El Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Senegal, Kenya or 
South Africa. 
  
                                               
 
39
 See Luckham and White (1996) Introduction, for a critical assessment of the democratic triumphalism 
that prevailed after the end of the Cold War.   
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Not has the advent of democracy necessarily swept away the previous 
authoritarian and security elites. Sometimes the latter have developed their own 
subtle ways of shaping political outcomes and closing down political spaces, often in 
defiance of the international community40. Military elites in former military 
dictatorships like South Korea, Indonesia, Chile or Guatemala have fought rearguard 
actions to preserve professional and political prerogatives. In Thailand, Nigeria and 
other countries formerly under military rule, ex-military elites have moved en 
masse into the political and business classes. In former communist states, like 
Russia, ex-nomenclatura and securocrats have proved highly adept at reinventing 
themselves as putative democrats. Even in longer-standing democracies, security 
and intelligence bureaucracies have enhanced their influence, notably in countries 
facing armed insurgencies like Sri Lanka, Colombia or even India.  
 
In this shadowy world of unresolved transition wholesale promotion of 
democracy as a solution to conflict is unrealistic. Firstly, as argued earlier, it is based 
on faulty analysis of how democracies actually function.  
 
Secondly, protracted violence tends to distort democratic institutions and 
reduce their capacity to assure security. Even legitimate and capable states like the 
post-apartheid regime in South Africa face enormous difficulties reversing legacies 
of violence such as ethnic polarisation, social exclusion, and criminalised informal 
economies, which tend to persist long after the end of hostilities. The difficulties are 
even more severe when governments or state legitimacy is seriously contested, as in 
Pakistan, or where the state is simply unable to govern as with the DRC. The 
problems tend to be compounded when violence, small arms, conflict resources, 
combatants, refugees, drugs etc, spill over national borders, as in many conflict-torn 
countries. 
 
Thirdly, it is unrealistic to expect democratization to resolve violent conflicts, 
when it may itself have fanned the embers of conflict. Cross-national studies 
indicate an inverted u relationship between democracy and political violence. Stable 
autocracies as well as consolidated democracies tend to be more peaceful than 
                                               
 
40 See Ottaway (2003). 
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countries still in transition to democracy41. Moreover electoral competition itself 
tends to waken latent national and ethnic identities, hence arousing rather than 
dampening political violence42.  
 
Democratic reforms tend to be opposed, often violently, by those who would 
loose from them, whether these be authoritarian elites, political parties or armed 
factions etc. The political war of attrition waged by President Mugabe and his 
cronies to stall democratic transition in Zimbabwe is a particularly vivid example. 
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement too for long remained hostage to the 
systematic non-implementation of democratic reforms, notably but not solely in the 
North.  
 
But whilst there is little doubt but that incomplete or stalled democracy 
increases the risk of political violence, this is not a convincing objection to 
democratization itself. Indeed the responsibility lies with those who use violence 
close political spaces, undermine rights and manipulate or subvert elections - that is 
with the opponents of democracy and not with its supporters. 
 
Yet those who promote democracy, especially from outside, cannot escape 
some share of the responsibility. Some regard political violence as a product of bad 
or inconsistent policy choices about the sequencing of democratic and war-to-peace 
transitions, including premature liberalization without prior state and institution-
building43. Others hold that democratic institutions themselves may aggravate 
conflicts, notably under majoritarian winner-takes-all systems. They suggest that 
the risks of political violence can be minimized if democratic institutions are 
redesigned to foster more inclusive, less confrontational, forms of politics44.  
                                               
 
41
 Henderson and Singer (2000).  
 
42 See the empirical sources cited in n.16. 
 
43
 This is the argument popularised by Paris (2004). 
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Prevailing approaches to the promotion and design of democracy, however, 
tend to be excessively reliant on policy fixes, privileging the high politics of 
democratic institution-building over the deep politics of democratisation. They 
often neglect historical context, political culture and alternative forms of democratic 
practice, especially in non-western countries. And to a large extent they discount the 
role political violence itself may play in delegitimizing and bringing down 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
 
Liberal Peace and Democratic Strategies for Security in Post-conflict States 
 
This chapter has argued that democracy and conceptions of liberal peace 
inspired by democracy are elusive, contested and do not offer universal panaceas 
for violent conflict.  That does not mean, however, that democracy and liberal peace 
are not worth pursuing in their own right. Nor does it mean that they cannot create 
credible political alternatives to violence; just that their capacity to do so must be 
demonstrated case by case, and not assumed a priori.  
 
Indeed it remains essential that modern democracies find ways of minimising 
violence and dealing with its legacies. Many have themselves emerged from war and 
political violence. According to Nancy Bermeo approximately half of all “free’ 
regimes formed after World War II were formed in the immediate aftermath of 
war”45. War-to-peace transitions have almost invariably built democratic 
constitutions, free elections, human rights and the rule of law into peace agreements 
or made them part of the wider post-conflict settlement.  
 
Democratic strategies for security are essential46, yet must take account of the 
immense variations in war-to-peace transitions and their political outcomes. In 
                                                                                                                                                                   
44 Luckham et al (2003) pp37-51 critically review the case for the conflict-resolution in plural 
societies by means of ‘consociationalist’ and other power-sharing forms of democracy made by 
Arend Lijphart and others democratic theorists.  
 
45
 Bermeo, (2003). 
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some post-conflict countries, like South Africa or Mozambique, democracy appears 
to have taken root, and violence has been largely if not entirely brought under 
control. In many others democratization has stalled, or conflicts have reignited, or 
both at the same time.  
 
Recent comparative statistical analysis suggests that the chances of durable 
peace and democratization have been higher when civil wars have come to an end 
through the military victory of one side or another. Negotiated peace settlements, on 
the other hand, including those brokered by the international community have 
tended to be less robust and have been less likely to install a durable democracy47.  
 
This might seem to support the ‘give war a chance’ case made by both 
conservative and critical realists48, who have made critiques of humanitarian 
intervention and peacebuilding. But how helpful is it to characterise the conflicts in 
countries like Somalia, the DRC and previously Liberia as ‘sites of innovations and 
reordering’49? Should their warring parties have been left to fight their disputes 
through to a bloody conclusion? Should the international community have refrained 
                                                                                                                                                                   
46
 Analysts of transitions to democracy from military governance have long argued the need for 
democratic strategies towards military and security establishments. See in particular Stepan, (1988) pp 
x-xi. Stepan’s analysis is extended to war-to-peace as well as democratic transitions by Robin Luckham 
‘Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict’ and by Gavin Cawthra and Robin 
Luckham ‘Democratic Control and the Security Sector’ both in Cawthra and Luckham (eds) (2003), 
chapters 1 and 13. 
 
47 See Toft (2010), especially chapter 4, which presents the statistical findings. Interestingly there 
was no significant difference in development outcomes.   
  
48 Notably Luttwak, (1999), who begins as follows: ‘An unpleasant truth is that although war is a 
great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve conflicts and bring peace’.  Critical analysts like 
Duffield (2001: 130). The same argument is implicit in Chandler’s (2006) chapters 1-2 critique of 
international engagement. Toft (2010), however, does not see international engagement as 
inherently problematic, but simply suggests it should pay more attention to the nature and quality 
of the peace. 
 
49 Duffield (2010) p.6. 
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from intervening50 or from supporting peace negotiations and peacebuilding in 
countries like Cambodia, Bosnia, Mozambique or Sierra Leone?   
 
Whatever the imperial biases and operational shortcomings of peacebuilding, 
the case for leaving violent conflicts to play themselves out is ethically untenable 
and empirically no more sound. Conflict-torn countries cannot be viewed as if they 
were a random sample of independent cases exposed to the experimental 
treatments respectively of victory and of negotiated peace. Most conflicts are 
networked globally and regionally, attracting arms and combatants across national 
borders and exporting insecurity and violence to neighbouring states. Many are no 
longer in any meaningful sense internal or civil wars, which their neighbours or the 
international community can safely leave to run their course.  
 
Moreover clear military outcomes tend to be possible only under special 
historical conditions, for instance where a well-organised military opposition is 
capable both of defeating the state and of enforcing a peaceful long-term political 
settlement. Negotiated peace agreements in contrast tend to be signed if there is a 
mutually hurting stalemate. It is hardly surprising that their political outcomes are 
more often contested and that hostilities are more liable to reignite.  
 
Even when the odds might seem to be heavily stacked in favour of violence, 
this seldom means that there are no spaces at all for democratic dialogue and 
peaceful change. But well-focused democratic strategies are needed in order to 
make best use of whatever spaces for change war-to-peace transitions may create. 
These strategies would be democratic in at least three senses (a) in posing 
democracy as a feasible alternative to violent conflict (b) in applying the methods 
and concerns of democratic politics to security questions (c) in bringing security 
and the institutions charged with delivering it firmly under the control of 
democratic institutions, including legislatures, the media and civil society.  
 
                                               
 
50 Indeed ‘give war a chance’ would not necessarily preclude international intervention, if the 
latter were to be backed with enough force to crush armed resistance and prevent its 
reemergence!  
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Democratic strategies would thus include but go well beyond current 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform 
(SSR) agendas of the donor community. Like the latter they would prioritise 
democratic oversight of military, security and justice establishments51. And they 
would attempt to minimise violence and raise its costs, for instance by ensuring 
accountability for abuses of human rights52.  
 
But democratic strategies can only be truly democratic if they reinterpret and 
indeed challenge the predominant global security and peace-building paradigms. 
They would also have to be rooted in struggles for peace, justice and democracy in 
each country’s political and international context53.  And they would have to hold 
global and regional as well as national decision-makers to account – especially so in 
countries like Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where much of 
the insecurity stems from outside their own national boundaries. 
 
Democratic strategies would necessarily require heavy doses of realism, 
including recognition of how security reforms may change balances of power and 
profit; hence may be opposed as well as supported by politically or militarily 
powerful interests, sometimes violently. They would build broadly based political 
coalitions among political activists, legislators, civil society bodies, rights 
organisations, security practitioners, researchers etc – and where feasible seek buy-
in from military and security establishments and even members of non-state armed 
groups. At the same time they could not be considered as democratic strategies 
unless security transformations are explicitly geared to reinforcing legitimate 
authority, renewing public trust in government and assuring democratic 
accountability. 
  
                                               
 
51 See Cawthra and Luckham  (2003), chapter 13. 
 
52 In the short term there tends to be a fraught trade-off between holding the perpetrators of 
violence accountable and securing their buy-in to peace settlements. But accountability is essential 
if violence is to be delegitimized over the longer term.   
 
53 Luckham (2009), pp 1-10. 
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Such strategies cannot be conjured up in the abstract or imposed from 
outside. They not only demand proper understanding of particular national 
histories but also of shifting global and regional conditions. Hence they would need 
if possible to influence the major international players – not just as sources of 
assistance, but also as potential obstacles to a democratic strategy in their own 
right. They would have to allow for the complexities of regional interactions, where 
neighbouring countries may both support peace agreements and undermine them 
or both at the same time as in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. And they 
would require adequate policy responses to the networks of insecurity and flows of 
conflict-resources, arms, combatants, refugees etc, which spread violence across 
national borders. Their starting point would be the security dilemmas facing each 
individual country. But democratic strategies would ultimately have to involve 
regional and international cooperation, since the major sources of insecurity cannot 
be tackled by individual states acting on their own.  
 
Some of the main historical trajectories ‘from’ violent conflict ‘to’ post-conflict 
political settlements are spelt out below. Each opens distinctive opportunities to 
create democratic strategies for peace and security. And each tends to throw up its 
own characteristic challenges.  
 
1. Post-war democratisation under external occupation. The paradigm case of a 
post-war democratic strategy for security might seem to be the installation of liberal 
democracies in Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan following World War II. But it 
followed a script largely dictated by the victors and required immense investment in 
economic reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. It also came at a heavy political 
price, including the division of the world into military blocs, the arms race and the 
installation of national security systems at the heart of Western democracies 
themselves. Furthermore it brought civil war and authoritarian governance in its 
wake in the unsettled peripheries of the Cold War such as Greece, Korea, Vietnam 
and others.  
 
2. Enforced ‘regime change’ in the context of continuing war and occupation, 
notably in Afghanistan and Iraq post 9/11. The major issue is that liberal democratic 
institutions have been implanted in a context of deep social polarization and armed 
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resistance, rather than embraced by war-weary citizens as in most of post-war 
Western Europe. Rather than institutionalizing democracy, occupation has 
delegitimized the state along with the occupiers; and it has embedded violence at 
the very heart of the political process.  
 
The priority given security and anti-terrorism has left the narrowest of 
political spaces for democratic politics. Neither democratic constitution-making nor 
elections have brought legitimacy to public authority54,being unlikely to do so 
without more tangible improvements in security and livelihoods. Protracted 
occupation has tainted democracy with an imperial stigma, boosting political Islam 
and religious sectarianism. Whilst in Iraq democratic institutions of a sort have 
eventually gained some traction, they remain fragile, lacking in public support and 
unable to resolve sectarian conflicts. In Afghanistan democracy remains hostage to a 
deteriorating security situation as well as a corrupt and increasingly illegitimate 
elected government.  
 
A democratic strategy for security would thus find itself heavily constrained 
from all sides. It would require credible plans to end occupation on terms 
determined by national stakeholders and not dictated by the internationals. Yet it 
would equally need to ensure that power did not simply fall into the hands either of 
corrupt and discredited governing elites or of armed opposition groups with narrow 
religious or sectarian agendas. Neither of these would be legitimate in a highly 
polarized political arena; and neither could be counted on to bring an end to 
violence and create an inclusive peace. Power-sharing would be essential (and is on 
the cards in both Iraq and Afghanistan), including the integration in one form or 
another of members of armed resistance groups into electoral politics, the civil 
administration and military, police and security institutions. But power-sharing 
could not by itself guarantee peace and stability without addressing fundamental 
issues about the legitimacy of state institutions and their capacity to deliver public 
goods including security to citizens.  
                                               
 
54
 See for instance Olivier Roy’s (2004) incisive analysis of the absence of legitimacy in both countries 
and its damaging consequences along with the interesting account of the vicissitudes of 
democratisation Afghanistan in Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl (2008).  
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3. Post-war democratisation under international trusteeship, under UN 
Missions or other forms of international administration, as in Cambodia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor and others. International trusteeship 
differs from foreign occupation not only because it is officially blessed by the 
international community, but more crucially also because it has had the assent of 
most if not necessarily all citizens. And although there have normally been 
unresolved security issues including some armed violence, international 
administrations have mostly not had to contend with protracted armed resistance. 
 
Even so the appropriateness of international trusteeship is sharply contested. 
Some policy analysts have contended that only long-term sharing of sovereignty 
with the international community can put failed and failing states on their feet55.  
Critics on the other hand have argued that trusteeship has merely reversed the hard 
won gains of national independence without delivering tangible improvements in 
security or development. Direct forms of empire, they argue have merely been 
replaced by the new strategic complexes of liberal peace, formed through shifting 
alliances among international agencies, IFIs, bilateral donors, international NGOs 
and peacekeeping forces56.  
 
Nevertheless there has often been genuine local as well as international 
support for democratization, including elections and broad-based constitutional 
settlements. This support has not necessarily extended to the reform of existing 
security and justice institutions, given their legacy of repression and injustice. More 
fundamentally democratisation under external trusteeship has still tended to raise 
serious questions over national ownership and about who ultimately benefits.  
 
International decision-makers have tended to deal with security issues as 
primarily technical. In some cases this has led to them being outmanoeuvred. In 
                                               
 
55 One of the most explicit statements of this view is by Krasner (2004).  
 
56
 See Duffield (2001), pp 13-15 and 31-34. The arguments against international trusteeship are 
challengingly formulated by Chandler (2006), whose Empire in Denial draws upon research on 
international trusteeship in the Balkans and Bosnia in particular. 
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others it has prevented difficult but essential political decisions from being made. In 
Cambodia, for example, the UN organised elections and supervised constitution-
making, but left the former communist party entrenched in the security apparatus, 
enabling it to seize control of the new ‘democracy’ after the UN had departed. In 
Bosnia and Kosovo international intervention ended the fighting, but froze the 
underlying conflict under unworkable power-sharing constitutions, perpetuating 
the international presence. In East Timor the UN turned a blind eye to unresolved 
tensions, which almost destroyed what had been regarded as a peace-building 
‘success story’.  
 
Even in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where international trusteeship is generally 
regarded as having facilitated genuine, if still shaky, war-to-peace and democratic 
transitions, there are still many unresolved issues. These include the incomplete 
reintegration of former combatants, weak democratic oversight of security 
institutions, the role of external actors (like DyneCorp, the corporation overseeing 
the reconstruction of the Liberian armed forces) and the legitimacy of non-state 
security and justice provision – all key issues for a democratic strategy towards the 
security sector.  
 
4. Democratisation written into internationally facilitated peace settlements. In some 
conflict-torn countries the international community has confined itself to brokering 
rather than enforcing peace agreements; and to encouraging rather than directly 
orchestrating democratic reforms, as under the Contadora Peace Process in Central 
America, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan or the war-to-peace and 
democratic transitions in Mozambique and Burundi57. Each progressed through 
multiple non-official as well as official channels, and engaged a wide range of 
international, regional and national stakeholders. This diversity of actors and 
approaches played a part in their success and facilitated well-considered and widely 
based approaches to democratization.   
 
                                               
 
57 Whilst both countries had UN Missions, these did not amount to long-term international 
trusteeship.  
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Yet the record of internationally brokered peace agreements is distinctly 
patchy. Some have only paved the way to renewed hostilities, as in Angola following 
the abortive elections in 1992, in Liberia post-1997 or Sri Lanka post-2003. And 
where peace processes are deemed to have ‘succeeded’, they may sometimes have 
achieved little more than fragile and contested truces, as with the 2000 Lusaka 
Accord and the string of agreements following it which gradually stabilised the DRC 
and paved the way to national elections in 2006 and the formation of a rickety 
coalition government58.  
 
In certain cases the international community’s own faulty implementation has 
been partly to blame, as with Angola’s premature 1992 national elections held 
before combatants had been fully demobilised. In other cases, notably the DRC, the 
efforts of an under-resources and incoherent international community have been 
stalled by the vested interests of a multiplicity of armed groups, interventions by 
neighbouring countries, a confused multiplicity of political players, the sheer 
complexity of the issues, and the long-standing breakdown of order throughout the 
country. Even Sudan’s more robust Comprehensive Peace Agreement hangs in the 
balance, neither assuring sustainable peace and genuine democratic reform in the 
North, nor resolving the vexed issues likely to arise from the impending 2011 
referendum on the independence of the South. 
  
5. State-enforced peace and potentially democratic reform following military and 
political defeat of armed rebellions. In such cases the narratives of democracy tend to 
be dictated by the state, and to chime in with the narratives of state security. The Sri 
Lanka government’s recent conclusion of its military campaign against the LTTE is 
the most recent example of state-imposed ‘democratic peace’. But the triumphalism 
of victory has largely trumped national reconciliation and there is little or no 
acknowledgement of the need for more inclusive governance and democratic reform 
– despite the recent announcement of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The 
power and prerogatives of the state and of its security establishments have simply 
been reasserted. It is far from certain whether there will be any real effort to reach 
                                               
 
58 Prunier (2009), chapter 9.   
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out to the Tamil minority, redress human rights abuses, restore lost press and media 
freedoms and establish more inclusive forms and practices of democracy.  
 
In Angola Jonas Savimbi’s death and the subsequent collapse of the UNITA rebellion 
in 2002 opened political spaces for reform, including UNITA’s reinvention as a 
political party. Nevertheless the regime’s authoritarian power structures have 
remained largely intact, still firmly controlling the large rents accruing from oil (and 
now diamonds, which previously financed UNITA’s military campaigns), which fund 
large-scale corruption, as well as the state’s large military and security apparatus.   
  
Both Angola and Sri Lanka might indeed learn lessons from Nigeria, where the 
Federal Military Government followed up its 1967-71 Civil War with a low-key but 
remarkably successful policy of national reconciliation – although its cumbersome 
and protracted ‘return to democracy’ was soon terminated by a further military 
coup.  
 
Yet it is hard to see where the initiative for a democratic strategy towards security 
might come from, and how it might overcome government obstruction and 
disinterest. Any leverage donors might have enjoyed, especially on security reforms, 
has been diminished by the government’s decision to wage war to a successful 
conclusion. Civil society organisations may have been active in pressing for human 
rights, national reconciliation and political reforms, especially in Sri Lanka; but they 
have been marginalised and sometimes actively suppressed by elected but highly 
controlling governments. 
  
6. Revolutionary peace and a new democratic order brought into being by successful 
armed insurrections against authoritarian regimes, as in Sandinista Nicaragua, 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda. In principle these should be fruitful terrain for 
democratic strategies towards security. Partly because the struggles against 
authoritarianism themselves challenged the prevailing theory and practice of 
security. And partly because the new regimes emerging from these struggles have 
often laid claim to the mantle of democracy, especially after the end of the Cold War 
had delegitimized alternative socialist models.  
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Yet the commitment of such post-revolutionary regimes to democracy, including 
democratic accountability of their security establishments, has mostly not matched 
these expectations. Sandinista Nicaragua’s participatory democracy was 
destabilised during the 1980s by the United States but also undermined through its 
own internal contradictions59.  
 
The post-war regimes in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda skilfully deployed the 
dominant narratives of political and economic liberalization to attract substantial 
donor support. All three countries have followed their own routes to national 
reconciliation – the gacaca or community courts in Rwanda are a much-cited 
example. All three countries have managed to reinvent themselves as development 
and governance success stories – in striking contrast to Eritrea, which emerged from 
a similar revolutionary matrix following an initially similar strategy of liberalization, 
which was completely abandoned during its border war with Ethiopia. 
 
It has become ever clearer that the commitment of such post-revolutionary regimes 
to liberalization has been mostly instrumental. Forms of democratic governance 
have been adopted with little corresponding transformation of power relations, 
which remain dominated by the state-building agenda and commandist politics of 
the original post-revolutionary elite60. Multiparty competition has been suppressed 
or marginalised in varying degrees; civil and political liberties have come under 
attack; and civil society organizations have had their activities limited put under 
surveillance, notably in Ethiopia. 
  
What has counted greatly in their favour has been their apparent capacity to 
stabilise previously insecure and divided countries and to re-launch them on the 
path of development (not unlike the Hun Sen regime in the rather different 
circumstances of negotiated transition in Cambodia). Theirs have been primarily 
state-building projects, legitimized by decorations of democracy and good 
governance. They have engaged with the donors’ security sector reform 
                                               
 
59 See Luckham (1998). 
 
60
 A prescient analysis of these trends can be found in Ottaway (1999),  
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programmes, partly in order to restructure their military, security and justice 
establishments, but mainly in order to keep donor funding flowing in.  Their interest 
in democratic accountability has been limited and there has been little interest in 
alternative approaches to security that might address the deep social, regional and 
ethnic divisions, which could still undermine their developmental achievements. 
Civil society bodies taking up security or human rights issues have come under 
surveillance and have found their activities increasingly constrained61.  
 
7. Peace and national reconciliation negotiated directly between liberation or 
revolutionary movements and outgoing regimes, reinforced by broad-based 
democratic reforms. Post-apartheid South Africa and (to a certain extent) Namibia 
and potentially the current transition in Nepal (though still held back by the 
disputes between Maoist former rebels and other contenders for power) are the 
most obvious examples.  
 
The struggle against apartheid differed from some other armed insurrections in that 
democracy was a central demand from the very beginning. Armed struggle took 
place in tandem with popular mobilization by a great variety of civil society groups; 
and brought about an essentially political victory in the context of military 
stalemate. Negotiations between the ANC and the outgoing government were 
process-driven and aimed at developing a workable consensus, based on extensive 
consultation with citizens, including the creation of a new democratic Constitution.  
 
This process of democratization included a major restructuring of the country’s 
security framework, including the integration of former MK fighters into the 
renamed South African National Defence Force, revitalised mechanisms for 
democratic and parliamentary control, and an extensive review of the country’s 
                                               
 
61 In Ethiopia, for instance, a new law on NGOs has been used to close down all NGOs with more 
than 10% external funding engaged in democracy, governance, human rights or security 
programmes, including in particular an NGO, which has played a leading role developing a 
democratic approach to security issues throughout the Horn of Africa.  
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entire security framework, placing the emphasis firmly on human and citizen not 
just state security62.  
 
The South African paradigm has been widely used as the reference point for security 
sector transformation elsewhere. In particular it has provided an implicit policy 
template for most donor security sector reform programmes – despite the key 
difference from the latter that in South Africa reform was internally generated and 
firmly anchored in a wider process of fundamental democratization. Yet the security 
transformation, though profound, has never delivered all that it promised, and has 
had to deal with corruption related to defence contracts, the failure of the police and 
justice systems to cope with crime, public indifference and growing lack of 
accountability and transparency63. Democratic strategies for security remain (as 
elsewhere) very much work in progress.    
 
8. Peace-building, state-building and construction of democracy from below with 
minimal inputs from the international community. The outstanding example remains 
Somaliland, where peace negotiations linked to a renegotiation of the state itself in 
the form of a new democratic compact with citizens have had a uniquely innovative 
potential64. In Somaliland two special conditions have made such as renegotiation 
possible. Political space was opened through the delegitimisation and indeed 
disappearance of the previous Somali state. And Somaliland was largely left alone by 
the international community, and so never became the focus of counterproductive 
international efforts to impose peace and reconstruct the state as in the rest of 
Somalia.  
 
Yet it was the people of Somaliland themselves and their clan elders, women’s 
groups, militia leaders etc, who negotiated a durable peace. The constitution-making 
                                               
 
62 Described by Gavin Cawthra, ‘Security Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ in 
Cawthra and Luckham (2003).  
 
63 See Seegers (2010)  
 
64
 See Leonard (2009). 
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process, which established a framework for democratic governance, grew out of 
these negotiations. The process was not without problems, including a lengthy and 
costly cantonment of fighters, and the somewhat patriarchal character of the 
compact, reliant as it is on the mediating role of clan elders. The ultimate product is 
a constitution, which reproduces many key features of liberal democracy, whilst 
giving constitutional form to an internally agreed democratic consensus. But the 
lack of international and African Union recognition along with the violence 
elsewhere in Somalia, are becoming serious obstacles to the long-term consolidation 
of the country’s democratic peace.  
  
What can be concluded from this brief survey of democratic strategies for security 
under different trajectories of war-to-peace transition? These transitions have not 
all led in the same direction. Nor have they necessarily brought about democracy, 
still less established democratic oversight over security. ‘Democracy by force’65, 
especially external force, tends to lead down a violent path, in which 
democratization easily becomes hostage to security concerns. These security 
concerns tend in turn to be compounded by absence of legitimacy, all the more 
under external intervention or occupation.  
 
Security and sometimes the use of force are unavoidable. Democratic governance - 
indeed any kind of governance - is enormously difficult in conditions of widespread 
violence. ‘Security first’ tends to be the nostrum of state-builders. Yet security 
should never be pursued on its own without regard to legitimate authority and 
inclusive peace-building. It should be built from within rather than imposed forcibly 
from the outside.  
 
The reality, however, in many post-conflict situations is that the openings for change 
are very limited. This means there is all the more need for democratic strategies for 
security to make use of these political spaces. Their fundamental principle is that 
even where force is necessary it should reinforce not replace negotiation and 
democratic consent and accountability. Moreover this yardstick should be applied 
consistently to all who deliver security or create insecurity – be they governments, 
                                               
65 The phrase is Karin Von Hippel’s (2000). 
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security forces, non-state militias, arms suppliers, peacekeepers, intervention forces, 
donors or international NGOs.   
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